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ABSTRACT
We develop a model of exploitative child labor with two key features: first, parents have
imperfect information about whether employment opportunities available to their
children are exploitative or not. Second, firms choose whether or not to exploit their
child workers. In our model, a ban on exploitative child labor is desirable, because it
resolves the problem of imperfect information faced by parents, and therefore leads
to Pareto efficiency. We also find that a ban leads to an increase in the wages of child
w o r k e r s ,a n dt h a tf i r mp r o f i t s ,e v e nf o rf i rms that do not exploit child workers, fall.
Finally, a ban has ambiguous effects at the macroeconomic level: aggregate child
employment and aggregate output can rise or fall.
JEL CLASSIFICATION NUMBERS: D1, J2, J4
KEYWORDS: child labor, economic exploitation1
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to construct a model of exploitative child labor. The
contribution is to bring the recent discussion of child labor in the formal economics
literature–which has focused on any work that children do--more in line with the
discussion that has taken place among policymakers–which addresses primarily certain
forms of work. As Kaushik Basu (1999) notes, the main reason for analyzing child labor
is to inform policy. If the child labor with which analysts concern themselves differs too
much from that about which policymakers worry, the usefulness of the analyses to policy
making will be compromised.
Starting with Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van (BV, 1998) there has been an
upsurge in theoretical work that isolates the reasons why children work. In BV, low
household income or wealth and the possibility of substituting children for adults in
production can lead to equilibria in which children work. We (Swinnerton and Rogers,
1999; Rogers and Swinnerton, 2002) and Sylvain Dessy and DJsirJ Vencatachellum
(2001) extend this work to map out the effects of income or resource inequality in an
economy on its incidence of working children. Jean-Marie Baland and James A.
Robinson (2000) and Priya Ranjan (2001) link the phenomenon of working children to
imperfect capital markets; children may end up going to work in part because their
families are unable to borrow against future earnings to finance schooling. Dessy and
StJphane Pallage (2001) trace child labor to the absence of coordination between parental
decisions to invest in their children’s human capital and firms’ decisions to invest in skill-
intensive technologies.2
It is important to note that none of this work addresses the distinction between any
work done by children and exploitative child labor. This distinction is currently very
important in policy-making circles, where it is recognized that the “Worst Forms of Child
Labor” can do damage to children.
1 Current economic theory on child labor views parents
as altruistically seeking to maximize their children’s utility. But if parents seek to
maximize their children’s utility and we accept that children are harmed by the Worst
Forms of Child Labor, why do we observe children in Worst-Forms situations?
Dessy and Pallage (2002) suggest that it is because Worst-Forms jobs pay better
than other jobs available to children. Parents recognize the harm the Worst Forms can do
to their children, but may send their children into Worst-Forms jobs anyway if they view
the higher wage paid by those jobs as compensating for the harm. Particularly in the
context of extreme poverty, the compensating differential for the harm done by the
Worst-Forms of Child Labor may be enough to make that harm preferable to the harm
that might be done by accepting a lower paid job and suffering a dismally low material
standard of living. In this context, Dessy and Pallage are right to emphasize that
policymakers need to give utmost consideration to the poverty that causes this child
labor, and to avoid simply seeking to ban the Worst Forms of Child Labor.
We think the policy interest in the Worst Forms of Child Labor emanates from a
concern that these types of labor are exploitative per se. We construct our model to
capture this concern. Parents seek to maximize their children’s utility, but have imperfect
information when they decide whether their children should enter the labor force. When
they send their children to work, the parents hope that they are sending them to a
1 The next section discusses more completely the terms “exploitative child labor” and “Worst Forms of
Child Labor.”3
situation that makes them better off. They have this hope because they know that there
are working situations that can be beneficial for their children. However, this hope is
sometimes not realized and the child ends up in an exploitative work situation. That is,
the parents may be “tricked” into sending their children into exploitative work. Since
firms recognize that parents face imperfect information when making decisions, in
equilibrium there is the opportunity for some--but not all--firms to exploit child laborers.
In our model, a ban on exploitative child labor is desirable, because it resolves the
problem of imperfect information faced by parents, and therefore leads to Pareto
efficiency. It also has some interesting distributional impacts. In contrast to Dessy and
Pallage, who suggest that a ban leads to a fall in the wage paid to working children, we
find that a ban leads to an increase in the wages they receive. We also find that all firms,
whether they formerly exploited child workers or not, suffer in terms of reduced profits.
Finally, we find ambiguous effects at the macroeconomic level: aggregate child
employment and aggregate output can rise or fall.
The next section of the paper describes more specifically what we mean by
exploitative child labor and presents anecdotes to demonstrate that our contention that
parents are tricked into sending their children into exploitative child labor is true, at least
in some cases. Section III presents the model. Section IV traces through the welfare
implications of banning exploitative child labor. Section V concludes. An Appendix
contains the proofs to all formal propositions.
II. What is Exploitative Child Labor?4
Since the motivation for our theory is both to catch up with and to provide rigor to
the policy discussion, it is worthwhile to consider what the term “exploitative child labor”
means in that discussion.
In early policy-oriented discussion of child labor, it was often assumed that all
work by children is necessarily harmful. By the mid-1990s, it became more commonly
understood that some work could be beneficial for children, since it could allow them to
achieve at least a subsistence level of consumption or to acquire skills. In this spirit, the
term exploitative child labor generally came to distinguish certain work that was clearly
harmful to the children involved (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 1996, Swinnerton, 1997).
In 1999, the 184 member nations of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
passed the “Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention” (Convention 182). An ILO
Convention has the status of an international treaty. After it is passed, each country then
decides whether or not to ratify it. As of April 2002, 117 countries had ratified
Convention 182.
2 The rate of ratification of Convention 182 has been the fastest of any
Convention in the ILO’s 83-year history.
3
In our view, Convention 182 serves both to provide some additional specificity
about exploitative child labor and as a formal vehicle for demonstrating a growing
consensus that the particular forms of work that qualify as exploitative do harm children.
Article 3 of Convention 182 defines the “Worst Forms” as:
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and
trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or
2For a listing of the countries that have ratified ILO Convention 182, including the date of ratification, see
http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C182.
3 “Support for the Global Ratification Campaign: The World is Uniting” on the ILO’s web site at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/index.htm.5
compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict;
(b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the
production of pornography or for pornographic performances;
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in
particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the
relevant international treaties;
(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried
out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
To our way of thinking, Convention 182 seeks to identify a set of practices that
should be avoided by children, even if it means that children do not work at all. These
practices are proscribed because of a general belief that the children are better off not
working at all than in a Worst Form. If children are in the Worst Forms, exploitation
occurs because they feasibly could be better off doing something else. But if they would
be better off doing something else, how do children end up as exploited child laborers?
One possibility is that they are stolen outright. In this case, the preferences of, or
the constraints faced by, the children or their parents do not figure into what happens to
the children. Other possibilities recognize that in most instances parents decide what
their children will do. In these cases, one of two assumptions can be made. The first is
that parents do what is in their own or the household’s best interest, regardless of what is
in an individual child’s best interest. Under this assumption, if the child ends up as an
exploited child laborer, the parent can be depicted as willingly deciding to exploit the
child. The other assumption is that parents always decide for their children based on
what is in the best interests of the children. Under this assumption, it is still possible for
children to end up as exploited child laborers if the parents are tricked or deceived, i.e., if
they rationally believe that they are doing what is best, but it turns out that they are not.6
Similarly, if children make their own utility-maximizing decisions, trickery or deception
could still lead them into exploitative situations.
The child labor literature suggests that all three routes to exploitative child labor
exist in the world today. It also suggests that once a child enters into an exploitative
situation, a variety of barriers to escape may be erected to prevent the children from
leaving. Typically, these barriers involve in some way the removal of children from the
parents’ household, and the children lose access to the financial and emotional support
that their parents may have provided.
We give just a few anecdotes. The United States Department of Labor (USDOL,
1999) reports that in Burma, young boys are often abducted from school and forced to act
as porters for the military. Lim (1998) discusses how children enter the sex sector in
Southeast Asia. She emphasizes the role of persuasion, deception or threats from adults
in getting children to enter the trade. Sometimes the adult responsible is a child’s parent,
but other times parents agree to the removal of children from their home on the belief that
the child is going to be offered a training, educational, or work opportunity, that will
actually improve the child’s situation. In a case study of the trafficking of Nepali girls
and women to brothels in Bombay, Human Rights Watch/Asia (1995) establishes that
while outright abduction is sometimes the way that girls are forced into prostitution,
deception or fraud is more common. Promises of marriage or better jobs lead poor
parents or the girls themselves to decide that the girls leave Nepal for Bombay. In many
cases these promises are not realized, and the girls find themselves in brothels. A number
of different strategies may be employed to keep girls compliant and to prevent them from
leaving. These include physical restraint from escape, violent beatings, psychological7
abuse, depriving the girls of appropriate street clothing, and concealing from them where
they actually are. Typically any money that changes hands in payment for the girls’ work
is not seen by the girls, and they have no idea of the amounts paid. Anti-Slavery
International (1998) describes the practice of “placing” children, and also their trafficking
into bondage, that occurs among West African Countries. In Benin, some impoverished
parents seek to make themselves and their children better off by placing their children in
the homes of strangers or distant relatives, whom the parents believe will offer training
opportunities to their children. Instead the children become domestic servants, often
unpaid. Some children are trafficked across borders to destinations as far away as
Nigeria and Gabon. The distance placed between parent and child can only serve to
remove the parent’s ability to choose for the child, and to make it unlikely that the child
can escape from the exploitative situation.
III. The Model
The model we analyze in this section is concerned with instances when parents
are tricked. At the outset we wish to emphasize that we do not model this trickery as
“full deception.” Instead, the parents have some idea that their children might end up in
an exploitative situation. In many situations of trickery described in the child labor
literature, including those described above, the villages that the exploited children come
from are often the same ones from generation to generation. Additionally, former child
laborers, exploited or not, sometimes return home. So, it is unlikely that latter-generation
parents in these villages can be completely unaware that an undesirable fate is a
possibility for the children who are sent away from home to work. At the point when8
they decide whether or not their children will enter the labor force, they somehow have to
deal with this possibility in their decision making.
We also note that the model is static. This is not to deny the very important
dynamic issues associated with child labor. Indeed some of the most persuasive
arguments against child labor spring from analyses that recognize the dynamic and long-
term connection between going to school instead of working, and the future benefits that
accrue from following this strategy [e.g., Ranjan (2001), Baland and Robinson (2000),
USDOL (2000)]. But there is a question as to whether and under what conditions the
immediate elimination of exploitative child labor can also yield immediate positive net
benefits. A simple static model provides a good tool for addressing this question that
should neither belittle nor contradict the findings of models cast in a dynamic framework.
A. Households
Parents make decisions for their children. They seek to maximize each child’s
utility.
4 Each child has a utility function of the form
) 1 , ( l − c u
where c is total consumption, l − 1 is leisure, and the endowment of time is 1 ( ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ l ).
The utility function is increasing in its arguments and is quasi-concave. The consumption
good is the numeraire.
In competitive employment, each child has non-child-labor (“outside”) income Y,
which we assume to be a parental contribution. In addition, child labor earns the wage
w, so the budget constraint is l w Y c + = . The utility maximization problem can be
written:9
) 1 , ( max ]} 1 , 0 [ { l l l − + ∈ w Y u (1)
The utility-maximizing level of labor, * l , satisfies:
5
0 *) 1 *, ( *) 1 *, ( 2 1 = − + − − + l l l l w Y u w Y wu (2)
Note that * l depends on the child’s wage, w, and on the parental contribution, Y. If
leisure is a normal good, then 0 / * < ∂ ∂ Y l .
When children enter exploitative employment, we assume they are exploited to
the maximum extent possible: they must use all of their time endowment on labor
( 1 = l ), and in return receive only that level of support from their employers that ensures
their survival. We will denote this support as s. We also assume that exploited child
laborers are cut off completely from their parents, so they lose access to outside income.
Exploited children therefore have utility equal to u(s,0). But it is not this absolute level
of utility that is necessary to our results. Rather, the necessary assumption is suggested
by our discussion of Convention 182: that children are worse off in exploitative
employment than not working at all. That is,
Assumption 1: u(s,0) < u(Y,1)
When deciding to send their children to the labor market, the household does not
know for certain whether the work the children will end up doing will be exploitative or
not, but they do know that there is some probability, p, of exploitation.
6 Accordingly,
4 We could generate equivalent results if we assumed the children made their own decisions. No principal-
agent or intra-family bargaining or budgeting issues are assessed in this model. The description of parents
as the decision makers is adopted solely to conform with predominant social and legal practices.
5 We assume the utility function is such that the solution is an interior one. Allowing for corner solutions in
which R* is equal to zero or to 1 either rules out child labor or complicates the model without producing any
new results.
6 The literal interpretation that parents know precisely the odds that the child will end up in exploitative
child labor is contestable. It would be more realistic to assume that they guess p with some error.
Similarly, in a dynamic model one could incorporate learning about the true value of p from one generation
to the next. We believe that this added realism would add complexity without changing the qualitative
nature of our results. For simplicity and convenience, we maintain that parents know p.10
parents view allowing a child to participate in child labor as a lottery. There is some
chance of “winning” a job in the competitive sector and some chance of losing by ending
up in exploitative employment. Given this uncertainty, the household will send its
c h i l d r e nt ow o r ks ol o n ga st h ee x p e c t e du t i l i t yfrom working is no smaller than the utility
from not working, i.e., so long as
) 1 , ( *) 1 *, ( ) 1 ( ) 0 , ( Y u w Y u p s pu ≥ − + − + l l (3)
When equation (3) holds with equality, it defines the maximum probability of
exploitation that is consistent with parents allowing their children to enter the labor
market. We normalize the population of children to unity, so that p is also the number of
exploited child laborers
Note that exploitative child labor cannot exist unless non-exploitative child labor
also exists. Because of Assumption 1, (3) cannot hold if p=1. Thus, if exploitative
child labor exists, it must be the case that p <1 .
B. Firms
One unit of capital is required to start a firm. Assuming that there are K units of
capital in the economy, there will be K firms. Firms can be classified into two different
sectors, based on their human resource policies. We call the first sector the competitive
sector. The second is the exploitative sector. In this section of the paper we describe the
profit-maximizing decisions of these firms, and how capital and child labor are allocated
across both sectors of the economy.
Each firm produces output according to a production function, f(.) ,that depends
only on child labor, l, with f’ >0 and f” <0 .
7 Whether a firm operates as an exploiter or
7 The existence of adult labor could be accommodated in this model in a variety of ways without changing
its qualitative results. For example, instead of assuming that a unit of capital is needed to run a firm, we11
in the competitive sector will depend on the returns to capital in each sector. Competitive
firms each hire c l hours of child labor, so that the return to capital in that sector equals
c c c w f l l − = ) ( π . Exploitative firms hire x l hours of child labor, so that the return to
capital in the exploitative sector equals x x x s f l l − = ) ( π . No firm has any incentive to
move from one sector to the other when
x x c c s f w f l l l l − = − ) ( ) (. ( 4 )
This condition, which we will refer to as the entry/exit condition, determines the
allocation of firms across the two sectors.
1. The Competitive Sector
In the competitive sector, firms face a perfectly competitive labor market. In
equilibrium there are N competitive firms. Profit maximization implies:
0 ) ( ' = − w f c l (5)
Equation (5) defines the firm’s demand curve labor in the competitive market, ) (w c l .
The market for non-exploitative child labor clears when
) ; ( * ) 1 ( ) ( Y w p w N c l l − = (6)
Equation (6) states that the aggregate (non-exploited) labor demanded by competitive
firms, ) (w N c l , equals the aggregate amount of non-exploited labor supplied, which in
turn equals the number of non-exploited workers, (1-p), times the amount of labor
supplied by each of them, ) ; ( * Y w l .
2. The Exploitative Sector
could assume that a unit of adult labor is needed and that K is the population of adult laborers. Or, we
could use the Basu and Van (1998) “substitution axiom” to model the productive value of child labor vis-a-
vis adults. In any case, there seems to be little loss in generality by not considering adult labor explicitly.12
In the exploitative sector, firms gain total and permanent control over their
workers. These firms do not “hire” workers; they “capture” them. That is, they follow a
policy of enslavement. Workers exploited in this fashion cannot migrate away from the
firm, and except for what it needs to pay the worker to survive (s), an exploitative firm
can extract all surplus from any worker it exploits. In contrast to the competitive sector,
there is no market-mediated price mechanism that allocates workers across exploitative
sector firms.
8 We emphasize that these firms seek to profit by capturing workers,
forcefully keeping the workers in their employ, and forcefully extracting the full value of
the surplus from each exploited or enslaved workers. In equilibrium, there will be K-N
exploitative firms.
If we assume that each exploitative sector firms is as adept as any other at
capturing child laborers to be exploited, the maximum size of the pool of exploited child
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maximum size of the pool of exploited child laborers an exploitative sector firms would
like to employ,
d
x l , is given by the usual first-order condition for profit maximization,
i.e., 0 ) ( ' = − s f
d
x l . Actual employment at an exploitative firm, x l , will clearly equal its














The entry-exit condition (4) has direct implications for the size of exploitative-
sector firms, the solution to (7), and for the efficiency of this solution.
8 We also do not allow exploitative firms to buy and sell the individuals they capture, i.e., there is no13
Proposition 1: For any p, firms in the exploitative sector are smaller than firms in







Corollary 2: s f x > ) ( ' l
The Proposition is surprising, because the exploitative sector firms have the same
production technology as the competitive sector firm, but they pay a lower wage. Thus,
they have a higher demand for labor than do firms in the competitive sector. But the
entry-exit condition (4) implies that they cannot satisfy this demand. If they could, their
profits would exceed those of competitive firms, and competitive-sector firms would
migrate over to the exploitative sector. This migration would continue until profits were
the same in both sectors. But because the exploitative sector wage (s) is lower than the
competitive wage (w), equation (4) can only hold if each exploitative-sector firm uses
fewer hours of child labor than each competitive-sector firm.
We note that exploitative sector firms maximize profits in the presence of a
binding “labor-supply” constraint (Corollary 1).
10 Exploitative firms do not operate
efficiently, since the marginal product of labor at these labor-supply-constrained firms
exceeds the marginal cost of labor (Corollary 2).
While we explicitly consider firm behavior only in a static setting, three dynamic
issues should be noted. First, we rely on the usual implicitly dynamic story about how
secondary market for slaves.
9 The proofs of all propositions may be found in the appendix.
10It is worth noting that what we have assumed here is that the exploitative sector is made up of a number
of firms each of which has an extreme form of monopsony power over each worker it employs. The
monopsony power results from the lack of mobility of exploited workers, and its implications are not much
different than the local monopsony power that motivates much of the economics literature on job-search
(even though the reason assumed for this lack of mobility is different). In the job-search literature, the
uniform allocation of workers across firms is called “random search.” Also, labor-supply constrained firms
are common because the technology is linear in labor (e.g., Albrecht and Axell, 1984) or because, as is the
case here, entry and exit of firms is endogenous to the model (e.g., Swinnerton, 1996).14
potential worker migration enforces market clearing in the competitive sector. Second,
we assume implicitly that worker sorting into sectors is once and for all. Workers who
start to work in the exploitative (competitive) sector always work in that sector. Finally,
we suppose that firms look into the future, and resist taking actions (driving p above the
maximum value that would be tolerated by households) that would drive them out of
business, because they would then forfeit all future returns to capital. Households are
unforgiving: if firms ever exploit more than p children, households withdraw their
children from the labor force completely and forever.
11
C. Equilibrium
In an equilibrium with child labor, four conditions must hold. First, equation (3)
must hold with equality, so that the expected utility from children working equals the
utility from keeping the child out of the labor force. This follows directly from the fact
that if (3) remains as an inequality, the measure of exploited children would be smaller
that households would tolerate, ex ante. There would be opportunities to exploit that are
not pursued. But since exploitative sector firms have an excess demand for workers to
exploit, this cannot happen. They will exploit everyone they can. The equilibrium
condition from the household side of the model is thus:
) 1 , ( )) ; ( * 1 ), ; ( * ( ) 1 ( ) 0 , ( Y u Y w Y w w Y u p s pu = − + − + l l (8)
The remaining equilibrium conditions are the profit maximization condition (5); the
labor-market clearing condition (6); and, the no-entry/exit condition (4), in which we
11 Essentially we are assuming that competitive-sector firms recognize the impact of their actions on p and
their own future viability, so that they do not “bait and switch” by portraying themselves as competitive-
sector firms during recruitment and then acting as an exploitative-sector firm when the children are
secured. A potentially more satisfying, but more complicated, mechanism for ensuring that firms sort into
sectors is to model a system of fines and some probability of detection for exploitative-sector firms that15
replace x l with ) /( N K p − . There are four unknowns in this system of equations: w, p,
N, and c l .
As noted earlier, Assumption 1 ensures that exploitative child labor cannot exist
unless non-exploitative child labor does as well. We now would like to focus attention
on economies that always have child labor. Let us define w ~ as the marginal product of
labor if 0 = p , that is, if no children are in exploitative work. We now introduce
Assumption 2: 0 ) ; ~ ( * > Y w l .
This assumption states there is a positive supply of child labor even if there is no
exploitative child labor.
Note that when p is determined in equilibrium, it cannot be the case that there is a
complete absence of exploitative child labor: Assumption 2 ensures that equation (8)
cannot hold if p =0 .
12 This guarantees the following.
Proposition 2: An equilibrium with both exploitative and non-exploitative child
labor exists.








sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium. However, as becomes clear in the
next section, whether or not equilibrium is unique is of little consequence in determining
the effects of banning exploitative child labor. A ban has the same welfare implications,
regardless of how many equilibria exist initially, or from which one the economy begins.
deters competitive-sector firms from pursuing a “bait-and-switch” strategy. This is a matter that we intend
to pursue in future work.
12 If p=0, then the expected value of working exceeds the expected value of not working, i.e.,
) 1 , ( )) ; ~ ( * 1 ), ; ~ ( * ~ ( Y u Y w Y w w Y u > − + l l ; therefore, p > 0 if (8) holds.16
IV. Welfare Effects of Banning Exploitative Child Labor
We have established that when there is imperfect information about the fate that
awaits children in the labor market, exploitative and non-exploitative jobs will exist for
children in equilibrium. It is well known that imperfect information is a source of
economic inefficiency. An effective ban on exploitative child labor, i.e., a policy that
sets p equal to zero, eliminates this inefficiency. A ban also affects the distribution of the
proceeds from economic activity in our model, and so it is worthwhile to continue our
discussion of the welfare implications of banning exploitative child labor by looking
more at the effects on children, firms, and society in the aggregate.
Proposition 3 summarizes the effect of a ban on exploitative child labor on
individual working children.
Proposition 3: A ban on exploitative child labor increases the wage paid to working
children.
In our model, an effective ban on exploitative child labor has the effect of creating
a one-sector competitive economy. Children released from exploitative work join other
children in seeking work from competitive firms, thereby increasing the aggregate supply
of labor in the competitive sector. At the same time, former exploitative-sector firms can
either shut down, in which case they earn zero profits, or adopt the competitive human
resource policy and earn a positive profit. They adopt the competitive policy, thereby
increasing the aggregate demand for labor in the competitive sector. Since the scale of
firms in the exploitative sector was smaller than in the competitive sector to begin with,
and since non-exploited children do not work as many hours as exploited children, the
increase in the supply of labor in the competitive sector is smaller than the increase in
labor demand; therefore, the competitive-sector wage goes up.17
All working children, whether they started in exploitative- or competitive-sector
jobs, clearly benefit from the ban, because all now earn a higher wage. Moreover, every
child is now working for the utility-maximizing number of hours, ) ; ( * Y w l . We note
that while formerly exploited child labors can clearly work no more than they did before,
child laborers who always worked for competitive-sector firms may respond to higher
wages by supplying more hours.
Proposition 4 summarizes the effect on firms of banning exploitative child labor.
Proposition 4: A ban on exploitative child labor reduces the size of competitive
firms, and reduces the return to capital.
Because the wage paid to child laborers rises in response to a ban on exploitation,
competitive sector firms reduce the number of hours of child labor that they employ.
Profits, which in this model are the returns to capital, therefore fall. Since all firms
earned the same profit when the two-sector equilibrium was allowed to exist, all firms
now earn lower profits because of the ban.
Proposition 5 establishes that the effects of the ban on exploitative child labor on
common aggregate indicators of welfare are ambiguous.
Proposition 5: A ban on exploitative child labor may cause aggregate hours worked
by children to rise or fall, and may cause aggregate output to rise or fall.
The ambiguous effect on aggregate employment traces directly to the observation already
made that formerly exploited child laborers will work less because of the ban, while other
children will work more (so long as labor supply is upward-sloping), so that the total
increase in competitive-sector employment could exceed the decrease in exploitative
employment. The size of the increase in employment in the competitive sector is18
bounded above by the amount of the increase in labor demand, at the initial equilibrium
wage. This increase in labor demand exceeds the fall in exploitative employment. The
increase in competitive employment is bounded below by the amount of the increase in
labor supply. At the initial equilibrium wage the increase in labor supply is less than the
reduction in hours of exploitative labor (the formerly-exploited workers work fewer
hours in the competitive sector). In equilibrium, whether competitive employment rises
by more or by less than exploitative employment falls will depend on whether
equilibrium employment is closer to the demand side or to the supply side effect. This in
turn depends on relative elasticities of labor demand and labor supply.
13 The interesting
point to note is that a ban on exploitative child labor could mean that overall measured
work activity among children rises.
That aggregate output may rise or fall follows, almost directly, from the fact that
aggregate labor inputs may rise or fall. The connection is not completely straightforward,
however, because it turns out that aggregate labor input may fall some, but not too much,
and there still may be some increase in output.
Proposition 6: If aggregate employment does not fall as a result of the ban on
exploitative child labor, then aggregate output rises.
Corollary: If a ban leads to a sufficiently small fall in employment, output still
rises.
From Proposition 4 we know that employment at firms that were always competitive
(AC) must fall as the result of the ban. The hours released from the AC firms are the
marginal ones, i.e., those yielding a marginal product below the new competitive wage,
but above the old competitive wage. If aggregate employment does not fall, then it must
be the case that hours released by AC firms are picked up by formerly exploitative (FE)
13 We were able to construct numerical examples where employment rose or fell as a results of the ban.19
firms. But since the wage now paid by the FE firms is the new competitive wage, the
hours newly employed by the FE firms yield a higher marginal product than they did in
AC firms. Thus redistributed labor moves from lower to higher productivity activities
and aggregate output increases. Clearly, there is some room for this “redistribution
effect” to have a dominant effect even when there is a small reduction in overall
employment, hence the Corollary to Proposition 6. However, if employment falls by too
much, so must output.
Even if employment and output do fall because of the ban on exploitative child
labor, it would not be correct to conclude that the ban has led to a reduction in societal
welfare. The ban still has the effect of bringing about efficiency and so it has to potential
to yield Pareto improvements. The fact that output and employment may fall but welfare
may have been enhanced illustrates that assessing country-level efforts to address
exploitative child labor is an area where common empirical measures of aggregate
welfare, e.g., per-capita gross domestic product or its growth rate, may be misleading, or
at least not very informative.
14
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we modeled formally a situation commonly cited as an explanation
for how children end up in exploitative child labor: they or their parents are tricked by
promises of a better life that prove not to be true. In our model, the deception is not
complete, as we assume that parents have some knowledge of the possibility of
exploitation when they enter their children into the labor force. In equilibrium, they are
willing to (need to) gamble. Some firms take advantage of this willingness by exploiting
children. But other firms do not: in fact, if some firms did not indeed offer a better life20
for children than they could obtain without working at all, parents would not be willing to
gamble. Thus, trickery or deception as a route into exploitative child labor can only exist
as an equilibrium phenomenon if parents have some reason to believe that their children
can be better off working, and that reason, we presume, is that some children do end up
better off by working.
The optimal policy response to the uncertainty that supports an equilibrium with
exploitative child labor is to implement a ban on such labor. Doing this means that
parents no longer gamble when they send their children to work. If a child works, it is
because the child is better off working than not. The ban also is Pareto efficient.
However, absent other policy interventions, not everyone gains from the ban. Owners of
capital lose. The children gain more than the capitalists lose.
This paper contains words of caution for policymakers seeking indicators of
progress toward the elimination of exploitative child labor. Common measures of work
activity by children and common empirical measures of aggregate economic welfare may
give a misleading picture of the progress that is made in improving the working
conditions and welfare of children. In our model, an effective ban on exploitative child
labor can lead to an increase in work activity by children. Thus, an increase in measured
work activity by children does not imply a lack of progress. Similarly, a fall in aggregate
output that results from banning exploitative child labor does not imply lack of progress.
When banning exploitative child labor leads to a decrease in aggregate measured output
(it need not always do so), welfare still rises. The increase in welfare stems from
children’s increased consumption of leisure time, rather than from increased consumption
14 Cf. Swinnerton (1997) with regard to forced labor.21
of a good or service that is captured in standard empirical welfare measures such as per-
capita gross domestic product.22
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Let ) (v π be the maximized profit of any firm that pays the wage
rate v and faces no restrictions on its ability to satisfy its labor demand. It is
straightforward to show that 0 ) ( ' < v π ; therefore, ) ( ) ( s w π π < . If exploited firms satisfy
their labor demand, then equation (4) cannot hold. Therefore, exploitative firms must be
supply-constrained.
Given exploitative sector wages, s, and employment constrained so that
d
x x l l < ,
an exploitative-sector firm’s first-order condition for profit maximization is
0 ) ( ' > − s f x l , which means that profits decrease with decreases in x l and that firms will




= l . Suppose c x l l ≥ . Then,
since 0 ) ( ' > − s f x l , we know that ≥ − x x s f l l ) ( c c s f l l − ) (> c c w f l l − ) (, s o t h a t
equation (4) is violated. Thus, in order for profits in the exploitative sector to equal those





Proof of Proposition 2: For households, equation (8) implicitly defines ) (p w η = .
Because of the continuity of the utility function, ) (p w η = is continuous on [0,1).
∞ = → ) ( lim 1 p p η , i.e., as the probability of exploitation goes to one, the wage necessary
to induce families to send their children into the labor force goes to infinity.
For firms, first note that equation (5) implies a labor demand curve ) (w c l with
0 ) ( ' < w c l . Substitute ) (w c l into equations (4) and (6). Substitute p/(K-N) for x l in
equation (4). The resulting two-equation system
) ; ( * ) 1 ( ) ( Y w p w N c l l − = ,a n d
) /( )) /( ( ) ( )) ( ( N K sp N K p f w w w f c c − − − = − l l
implicitly defines ) (p w µ = . So long as the production and utility functions are
continuous, ) (p w µ = is continuous on [0,1). As 0 , 1 → → N p and the two-equation
system reduces to
K sp K p f p p p f c c / ) / ( )) ( ( ) ( ))) ( ( ( − = − µ µ µ l l ,
which implies that ) ( lim 1 p p µ → is finite.
Finally, from Assumption 2 it follows that ) 0 ( ) 0 ( η µ > . Thus, ) (p µ and ) (p η
must intersect at least once.25
Proof of Proposition 3: Denote as e w the equilibrium real wage before the ban on
exploitation. The aggregate supply of hours to the competitive sector equals
) ( * ) 1 ( e w p l − .A t e w , the ban on exploitation increases labor supply by
) ( * ) ( * ) 1 ( ) ( * e e e w p w p w l l l = − − ; labor demand also increases from ) ( e c w Nl to
). ( e c w Kl The increase in labor demand is greater than the increase in labor supply:









> , where the first part of the
inequality follows from Proposition 1, and the second from the fact that 1 ) ( * ≤ e w l .
Therefore, the equilibrium real wage must rise when p is set equal to zero.
Proof of Proposition 4: ) ( ' c f w l = .S i n c e 0 ) ( ' ' < c f l , if the real wage is higher, then
c l must be lower.
The return to capital is ) ( )) ( ( w w w f c c c l l − = π .S i n c e ) (w
w
c
c l − =
∂
∂ π
,t h er i s ei n
competitive-sector wages reduces profits (the return to capital).
Proof of Proposition 5: The change in aggregate employment equals
p L p N K c c c − ∆ = − − l l ˆ ,w h e r e 0 > ∆ c L is the change in hours of labor in the
competitive sector. If the aggregate supply curve for labor is upward-sloping, then c L ∆
is bounded below by ) ( * e w pl and above by c N K l ) ( − . Suppose c L ∆ =) ( * e w pl .
Then the change in aggregate hours worked equals 0 ] 1 ) ( * [ ) ( * < − = − w p p w p e l l .
Suppose c L ∆ = c N K l ) ( − . Then the change in aggregate hours worked equals
0 ) ( > − − p N K c l ,s i n c e ) /( N K p c − > l . Total hours worked could rise or fall
depending on the elasticities of the labor demand and labor supply curves.
Since child labor is the only input into production, the implied change in output is
ambiguous as well.
Proof of Proposition 6: There are two sets of firms to consider: the N “always
competitive” (AC) firms, and the K-N “formerly exploitative” (FE) firms. From
Proposition 4 we know that employment at each AC firm and so across all AC firms must
fall as a result of the ban. It follows that employment at the FE firms must rise. Suppose
that aggregate employment stays the same, so that the increase in FE employment equals
exactly the decrease in AC employment, i.e., each hour released from the AC sector is
picked up by the FE sector. For every hour released by the AC sector, the following must
be true:
we <M P AC < wA.26
where MPAC is the marginal product that hour would yield in the AC sector and wais the
wage in the post-ban competitive equilibrium. Since that hour is picked up by the FE
sector, the following must also be true:
wA < MPFE.
Thus, every hour reallocated from the AC to the FE sector has a higher marginal product
after the reallocation. So if total employment stays the same, output must go up (there is
no change in the marginal product of each hour that was already employed in each sector
and stays in the sector where it started). If aggregate hours go up, output obviously rises
even more, because any additional hour employed would have a positive marginal
product.